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•P3b < P1b               it is natural to expect this given the definition of these probabilities (in other words  
                          it is normal to expect banking stability to be easier to achieve if there is effort in   
                          this direction on the part of the authority responsible);  
•the lower  P0b and P3b, or the higher the risk of banking crises;  
• the higher P1p is, the probability of price stability when the monetary agent makes an effort to 
attain this, in the presence of stability in the banking system.    
 
9. Remarks and possible developments 
The advantage of entrusting the roles to a single agent can however be conjectured using a simple 
thought process.   
The minimum cost that the politician has to bear for incentives must at least cover the costs of effort 
and must therefore equal Cbp, if there is a single agent, and Cp + Cb if there are two. If Cbp < Cp + 
Cb, then it is clear that it is always more convenient to appoint a single agent. 
In the election period, the politician’s spending on incentives is even lower, in that as he does not 
want the central bank to be over-zealous, it will only equal Cb for two agents and Cbp - Cp for one 
agent. Therefore the minimum spending for the politician must be in the electoral period.  
If however we introduce a reputation cost, R, in cases in which although the central bank wants to 
act, it refrains from doing so in order to please the politician, then in the electoral period if two 
agents are appointed, the politician’s cost will be equivalent to 
Cb + (R/2)    if there are two agents and to 
Cbp - Cp + R  if there is one agent.  
In the non-electoral period, the politician’s costs will be equivalent to  
Cb + Cp     for two agents and to  
Cbp           for one agent.  
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Comparing these costs shows that, if Cbp < Cp + Cb then, in the non-electoral period, it will certainly 
be more convenient to appoint a single agent. In the election period, it will all depend on the 
difference 
Cbp - Cp + R – [Cb + (R/2)] = Cbp – (Cb + Cp) + (R/2) 
If this difference is zero, it will not matter at all whether one or two agents are appointed. If the 
value is >0, then one agent costs more than two agents and therefore it is better to appoint two 
agents; if on the other hand Cbp – (Cb + Cp) + (R/2) <0, it will be more suitable to appoint a single 
agent. The cost difference will rise in proportion to R, the reputation cost, assessed by the central 
governor. 
Firstly, it would be interesting to identify proxies to measure the governor’s reputation effect. 
Secondly, an empirical analysis could be made of whether or not these indicators of reputation are 
connected to the outcome of monetary and supervision policy. It should be remembered that the 
problem of measurability also exists for the second function mentioned.   
 
10. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the advantage to be gained in entrusting the jobs of “banking supervision” and 
“monetary policy” to two agents, Banking Authority (BA) and Central Bank (CB), or to a single 
agent, CB. In examining the policy maker’s choice between single or multiple authorities, the role 
of the political cycles was appraised.  For this purpose, two periods were examined: electoral and 
non-electoral. The model is that of a principal with two agents, where the principal is the political 
group in power, while the agents are, as we have said, BA and CB.  
The reached conclusion is that the political chooses the institutional design of regulatory authorities 
without being influenced by the electoral cycle. What is interesting is the importance of the costs of 
"capture", related to the different institutional hypotheses. The political will have convenience to 
choose a centralized setup, in the pre-electoral period, when the value that the head of the CB 
(governor) gives to his reputation is rather low. This will occur with higher probability when the 
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